We show how to securely realize any multi-party functionality in a way that preserves security under an a-priori bounded number of concurrent executions, regardless of the number of corrupted parties. Previous protocols for the above task either rely on set-up assumptions such as a Common Reference String, or require an honest majority. Our constructions are in the plain model and rely on standard intractability assumptions (enhanced trapdoor permutations and collision resistant hash functions).
INTRODUCTION
The task of secure multi-party computation involves n parties P1, ..., Pn, that wish to jointly and securely compute a functionality f (x) = (f1(x), ..., fn(x)) of their corresponding private inputsx = x1, ..., xn, such that party Pi receives the value fi(x). This functionality may be probabilistic in which case fi(x) is a random variable. Loosely speaking, the security requirements are that the parties learn nothing more from the protocol than their prescribed output, and that the output of each party is distributed according to the prescribed functionality. This should hold even in case that a subset of the parties maliciously deviates from the protocol. Shortly after its conceptualization, very strong results were established for secure multi-party computation. Specifically, it was shown that any probabilistic polynomial-time computable multi-party functionality can be securely computed, regardless of the number of corrupted parties, assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [38, 22] .
Concurrent Multi-Party Computation
The original setting in which secure multi-party protocols were investigated allowed the execution of a single instance of the protocol at a time. This is the so called stand-alone setting. A more realistic setting, however, is one which allows the concurrent execution of protocols. In the concurrent setting (originally introduced in the context of zeroknowledge [18, 17] ), many protocols are executed at the same time. This setting presents the new risk of a coordinated attack in which an adversary interleaves many different executions of a protocol and chooses its messages in each instance based on other partial executions of the protocol.
It has been noticed that security of a specific protocol in the stand-alone setting does not necessarily imply its security in the, more demanding, concurrent setting. It is thus of great relevance to examine whether the original feasibility results for multi-party computation in the stand-alone setting still hold when many copies of the protocol are executed concurrently.
Multi-party computation with honest majority. For the case of an honest majority, Canetti [9] , based on the works of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [6] , and Rabin and Ben-Or [34] , show that a protocol for secure multi-party computation that composes concurrently, can be achieved. (In fact, the protocol of [9] achieves the even stronger property of Universal Composability. See [9] for more details.) The proof of [9] relies on the fact that in the multi-party setting with an honest majority a specific simulation technique called one-pass black-box simulation (that is black-box simulation without the use of rewinding) can be performed. We note that this technique is inherently bound to fail in the case of a dishonest majority [11] .
Multi-party computation with a dishonest majority.
For the case of a dishonest majority, on the other hand, the situation is less satisfactory. The only previous positive results in the plain model (without set-up assumptions) are in the special-case of two-party computation and can be summarized as follows:
• Lindell demonstrated the feasibility of m-bounded concurrent two-party computation using O(m) communication rounds. [27] • Recently, Pass and Rosen showed that the notion of m-bounded concurrent two-party computation could be achieved using only O(1) communications rounds. [32] .
The notion of m-bounded concurrent composition, first considered by Barak [1] in the context of zero-knowledge, relates to a restricted form of concurrent composition, where an apriori bound m on the number of concurrent executions is specified before the protocol is constructed. Certainly the notion of unbounded concurrency, i.e, security is guaranteed even under an unbounded number of concurrent executions, is more appealing than that of bounded concurrency. However, a recent, surprising, result by Lindell [29] shows that unbounded concurrent two-party computation can not be achieved in general. 1 On the other hand, in the special case of zero-knowledge proofs, security under unbounded concurrent composition can be achieved [35] .
We note that the lower bound by Lindell also extends to the multi-party setting with a dishonest majority. The upper bounds of [27] and [32] , however, do not seem to directly extends to the multi-party setting, leaving the following important question unanswered:
Does there exist a protocol for secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority whose security is preserved under an a-priori bounded number of concurrent executions?
This is the question that we address in the current work.
Concurrent composition with set-up assumptions.
Before we state our results, let us mention a few words about the use of set-up assumption in order to deal with concurrency. The literature discusses a wide array of setup assumptions, most notably the timing assumption [17] , the Public-Key models [10, 15] and the Common Reference String (CRS) model [9, 13] . Whereas the former assumptions have been primarily used to obtain concurrent composition of zero-knowledge proofs, the latter assumption has 1 Note that the lower bound of [29] relies on the fact that the honest party chooses its input adaptively. It might still be possible to construct a protocol for unbounded concurrent two-party computation for the case when the honest party chooses its inputs ahead of the protocol executions.
been also used to obtain strong composition theorems for secure multi-party computation. Specifically, in the model assuming the existence of a Common Reference String, it has been shown how to achieve the very strong notion of Universal Composability for both two-party and multi-party secure computation [9, 13] . In particular, universal composability implies security under unbounded concurrent composition.
Nevertheless, although very strong result have been achieved in the CRS model it is still of both theoretical and practical interest to investigate the possibility of constructing protocols in the plain model, without extra set-up assumption, that compose concurrently. Firstly, in some settings it might be difficult to obtain the trusted set-up phase needed in order to set up a common reference string. Secondly, recent work seems to indicate that the CRS model might not reflect the security concerns than one would like to address in reality [31] . Loosely speaking, standard simulation-based definitions of security in the CRS model do not cover certain "natural" security properties that are satisfied in the plain model (e.g., deniability of protocols). Moreover, known impossibility results for composition in the plain model (e.g., [12, 27] ) will apply to any protocol that satisfies these "natural" security properties in the CRS model.
Our Results
In this work we address the above mentioned question and present a result of a positive nature. Specifically, we show that for any n-party functionality (two-party functionalities being a special case) there exist a protocol that is secure under bounded-concurrent composition, regardless of the number of corrupted parties.
The security of our protocol relies on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations [19] , as well as on the existence of collision resistant hash functions. For an integer m, the notion of m-bounded concurrent composition refers to a setting in which at most m copies of a protocol are executed concurrently (typically, m = m(k) is a fixed polynomial in the security parameter k). Our results are stated below. Although our main focus is on feasibility of multi-party computation with a dishonest majority that composes concurrently, we actually achieve the best one could hope for in terms of round complexity. By doing so we get the following corollary which is interesting in its own: [14] , although this protocol requires a logarithmic round-complexity. We further note that an important extra feature of our approach is the relative simplicity of the solution in comparison to the works of [27, 32, 26, 2] .
On the model of computation: In this work we consider a malicious static computationally bounded (i.e., probabilistic polynomial-time) adversary that is allowed to corrupt an arbitrary number of parties. That is, before the beginning of the interaction the adversary corrupts a subset of the players that may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
The parties are assumed to be connected through a pointto-point asynchronous public network, without guaranteed delivery of messages.
Following the standard of the area [19] , we assume that the communication channels are authenticated.
The focus of this work is not on fairness, and we therefore present a definition where the adversary always receives the output of the functionality first and then decides which of the honest parties that will receive its output (c.f. Secure computation with abort and no fairness in the taxonomy of [24] ).
The concurrent setting considered is a generalization of Lindell's treatment [27, 29] for concurrent secure two-party computation, which, in turn, is adapted from previous works on concurrent zero-knowledge [17] . We consider a single set of n parties that are running many concurrent executions of the same multi-party protocol, each time playing the same roles. The honest parties may adaptively choose their inputs to the protocol based on outputs received from previous executions. However, in each instance of the protocol the honest parties are required to act independently. The adversary, on the other hand, may arbitrarily coordinate its actions between the different executions.
The restriction on m-bounded concurrency is formalized by requiring that during the execution of a single instance of the protocol, messages from no more than m − 1 other executions are exchanged.
New techniques: Already in the case of (bounded) concurrent two-party computation, it was noticed that the main technical difficulty consists of constructing two zeroknowledge protocols that are simulation-sound with respect reduces down to secure computation with abort and no fairness in the taxonomy of [24] . As was noted in [24] , in a setting with a broadcast channel, any protocol for secure computation with abort can be transformed (in a roundpreserving way) into a protocol secure according to the more standard definition of secure computation with unanimous abort. This is obtained by letting the parties broadcast whether they received output or not, at the end of the protocol with abort.
to each other [27, 32] . Simulation-soundness (introduced by Sahai in a different context [37] ) means that the soundness of each of the protocols is preserved even when the other protocol is simulated at the same time with the roles of the prover and verifier reversed. The problem is related to the notion of non-malleability [16] . Unfortunately, since soundness, here, should hold also when concurrently simulating many zero-knowledge protocols, known techniques for achieving non-malleability, such as [16, 2] , do not seem to apply. The works of [27, 32] constructed protocols satisfying this notion. We note that their techniques inherently make use of the fact that in the two-party setting only two protocols need to be constructed. In fact, both [27] and [32] construct two asymmetric protocols and rely on different methods for proving simulation-soundness in each direction.
In the multi-party setting, on the other hand, the difficulty consists of constructing a family of polynomially many zero-knowledge protocols that are simulation-sound with respect to each other under concurrent executions. The main technical contribution of this work is the construction of a family of constant-round protocols satisfying this property. Although our techniques partly rely on techniques from [27] and [32] , the methods for achieving simulation-soundness are, in fact, quite different.
Interestingly, the problem of constructing a family of polynomially many zero-knowledge arguments, such that are the protocols are simulation-sound with respect to each other under parallel executions, has occurred before in the context of stand-alone secure multi-party computation [26] . Previously, the only known constant-round protocols satisfying this (potentially weaker) property were the non-malleable zero-knowledge protocols of Barak [2] (with extensions in [26] ). Our construction improves upon these protocols both in terms of assumptions (we rely on standard polynomialtime hardness assumptions, while the protocols of [2] rely on subexponential hardness assumptions), and in terms of simplicity.
We believe that our techniques for achieving simulationsoundness, and the zero-knowledge protocols constructed, are of independent interest and might find applications elsewhere.
Extensions to Arbitrary Sets of Parties
Until now we have focused on concurrent composition of multi-party protocols for a single set of parties. In this setting two (or more) parties are executing multiple concurrent executions of the same protocol, each time playing the same roles (i.e., using fixed roles). The setting originated in works on concurrent zero-knowledge [18, 17] , where in particular, one party acts as prover in all concurrent executions and another party acts as verifier in all executions. Alternatively, this setting can be seen as modeling many different provers and verifiers with the restriction that the adversary may only corrupt either parties acting as provers or parties acting as verifiers. In other words, the adversary may not corrupt both a party acting as prover and a party acting as verifier.
A more general setting considers concurrent composability of a protocol with arbitrary subsets of parties [28] . In this setting, arbitrary, and possibly intersecting, sets of parties concurrently execute the same protocol. In particular, there is no restriction on what role a specific party plays in the protocol, and the roles might be interchanged. This means that a party may play the role of P1 in one execution and simultaneously play the role of P2 in a different execution. In the case of zero-knowledge proofs, this would mean that a party may act as prover in some of the concurrent executions and act as verifier in the others.
In Section 3.3 we show that the framework developed in this paper can be extended to give a protocol for secure multi-party (and thus also two-party) computation for any number of corrupted parties, which remains secure under bounded-concurrent composition with arbitrary subsets of parties. As far as we know, for the case of two-party or multi-party protocols with a dishonest majority, this is the first positive result for any non-trivial functionality (zeroknowledge proofs being an important special-case) which achieves this property. We mention that our solution relies on the assumption that the participating parties have unique identities.
Subsequent Work and Open Problems
Unbounded concurrency. The elegant lower bound of Lindell [29] shows that unbounded concurrent composition can not be achieved in the model that we are considering (even for a single set of parties). Nevertheless, it might still be possible to achieve unbounded concurrency in a weaker model, where for example the inputs of the honest parties are fixed ahead of the protocol execution (i.e., inputs are chosen in a non-adaptive way).
Non-malleable cryptographic primitives.
In subsequent work [33] , our zero-knowledge protocols are used in order to construct simple constant-round protocols for nonmalleable cryptographic primitives, such as commitments and zero-knowledge, under standard cryptographic assumptions. Previous constant-round constructions relied on subexponential hardness assumptions [2] .
Cryptographic assumptions. We have shown that the notion of (bounded-concurrent) secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority can be achieved in a constant number of rounds based on standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions, such as the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations and collision resistant hash-functions. In contrast, stand-alone secure multi-party computation with polynomial round-complexity can be based on the existence of only enhanced trapdoor permutations [21] . This gives rise to two interesting open problems:
• Is it possible to construct a constant-round protocol for stand-alone secure multi-party computation with a dishonest majority, based on only enhanced trapdoor permutations?
• Is it possible to construct a protocol (which might have a non-constant round-complexity) for boundedconcurrent secure two-party/multi-party computation with a dishonest majority based on only enhanced trapdoor permutations?
Organization of the Paper
Formal definitions of bounded-concurrent secure multiparty computation can be found in Section 2. Section 3 contains a high level description of our main proof, as well as a description of our new zero-knowledge protocols.
DEFINITIONS
In this section we present the definition for m-bounded concurrent secure multi-party computation. The definitions below are generalizations of the definition of secure multiparty computation with abort and no fairness of Goldwasser and Lindell [24] and the definition of concurrent secure twoparty computation with adaptive inputs of Lindell [29] . Parts of the definition have been taken almost verbatim from [24] and [29] .
The basic description and definition of secure computation follows [23, 30, 5, 8] . We denote computational indistinguishability by c ≡, and the security parameter by k. For notational simplicity, we let the lengths of the parties' inputs be k.
Multi-party computation.
A multi-party protocol problem for n parties P1, ..., Pn is cast by specifying a random process that maps vectors of inputs to vectors of outputs (one input and one output for each party). We refer to such a process as a n-ary functionality and denote it f :
fn).
That is, for every vector of inputsx = (x1, ..., xn), the output-vector is a random variable (f1(x), ..., fn(x)) ranging over vectors of strings. The output of the i'th party (with input xi) is defined to be fi(x). In the context of concurrent composition, each party actually uses many inputs (one for each execution) and these may be chosen adaptively based on previous outputs. The fact that m-bounded concurrency is considered relates to the allowed scheduling of messages by the adversary in the protocol executions; see the description of the real model below.
Adversarial behavior. In this work we consider a malicious, static adversary. That is, at the beginning of the execution the adversary is given a set I of corrupted parties which it controls and through which it interacts with the honest parties while arbitrarily deviating from the specified protocol. The focus of this work is not on fairness. We therefore present a definition where the adversary always receives its own output and can then decide when (if at all) the honest parties will receive their output. The scheduling of message delivery is decided by the adversary.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in the protocol to what it can do in an ideal scenario. The ideal scenario is formalized by considering an incorruptible trusted third party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output.
Unlike in the case of stand-alone computation, here the trusted party computes the functionality many times, each time upon different inputs. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted third party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation.
Concurrent execution in the ideal model. Let I ⊂ [n]
denote the subset of corrupted parties. An ideal execution with an adversary who controls the parties I proceeds as follows:
Inputs: The inputs of the parties P1, ..., Pn are respectively determined by probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines M1, ..., Mn and the initial inputs x1, ..., xn to these machines. As will be described below, these Turing machine determine the input values to be used by the different parties in the protocol executions.
These input values are computed from the initial input, the current session number and outputs that were obtained from executions that have already concluded. Note that the number of previous outputs ranges from zero (when no previous outputs have been obtained) to some polynomial in k that depends on the number of sessions initiated by the adversary.
Session initiation:
The adversary initiates a new session by sending a (start-session, i) to the trusted party. If i ∈ [n] − I (that is Pi is an honest party) the trusted party sends (start-session, j) to Pi, where j is the index of the session (i.e., this is the j'th session to be started by Pi).
Honest parties send inputs to trusted party: Upon receiving (start-session, j) from the trusted party, each honest party Pi applies its input-selecting machine Mi to its initial input xi, the session number j and its previous outputs, and obtains a new input xi,j. Corrupted parties send inputs to trusted party: Whenever the adversary wishes it may ask a corrupted party Pi to send a message (j, x i,j ) to the trusted third party, for any x i,j ∈ {0, 1} n of its choice. A corrupted party Pi can send the pairs (j, x i,j ) in any order it wishes and can also send them adaptively (i.e., choosing inputs based on previous outputs). The only limitation is that for any j, at most one pair indexed by j can be sent to the trusted party.
Trusted party answers corrupted parties:
When the trusted third party has received messages (j, x i,j ) from all parties (both honest and corrupted) it setsx j = (x 1,j , ..., x n,j ). It then computes f (x j ) and sends (j, fi(x j )) to Pi for every i ∈ I.
Trusted party answers honest parties: When the adversary sends a message of the type (send-output, j, i) to the trusted party, the trusted party directly sends (j, fi(x j )) to party Pi. If all inputs for session i have not yet been received by the trusted party the message is ignored. If the output has already been delivered to the honest party, or i is the index of a corrupted party, the messages is ignored as well.
Outputs: Each honest party Pi always outputs the vector (fi(x 1 ), fi(x 2 ), ...) of outputs that it received from the trusted party. The corrupted parties may output an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its initial input and the messages obtained from the trusted party.
Let f : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n be a n-ary functionality, where f = (f1, ..., fn). Let S be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine (representing the ideal-model adversary) and let I ⊂ [n] (the set of corrupted parties) be such that for every i ∈ I, the adversary S controls Pi. Then the ideal execution of f with security parameter k, input-selecting machines M = M1, ..., Mn, initial inputsx = (x1, ..., xn) and auxiliary input z to S, denoted ideal f,I,S,M (k,x, z), is defined as the output vector of the parties and the adversary S resulting from the ideal process described above.
Note that the definition of the ideal model does not include any reference to the bound m on the concurrency. This is because this bound is relevant only to the scheduling allowed to the adversary in the real model; see below. However, the fact that a concurrent setting is considered can be seen from the above-described interaction of the adversary with the trusted party. Specifically, the adversary is allowed to obtain outputs in any order that it wishes, and can choose its inputs adaptively based on previous outputs. This is inevitable in a concurrent setting where the adversary can schedule the order in which all protocol executions take place. In particular, the adversary can schedule the executions sequentially, thereby learning previous outputs before defining the next input.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a real multi-party protocol is executed (and there exists no trusted third party).
We consider a scenario where the parties communicate through an asynchronous fully connected point-to-point network, without guaranteed delivery of messages. The communication lines between the parties are assumed to be authenticated and thus the adversary cannot modify messages sent by honest parties.
Let f , I be as above and let Π be a multi-party protocol for computing f . Furthermore, let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine such that for every i ∈ I, the adversary A controls Pi. Then, the real mbounded concurrent execution of Π with security parameter k, input-selecting machines M = M1, ..., Mn, initial inputsx = (x1, ..., xn) and auxiliary input z to A, denoted real m Π,I,A,M (k,x, z), is defined as the output vector of the honest parties and the adversary A resulting from the following process. The parties run concurrent executions of the protocol, where every party initiates a new session whenever it receives a start-session from the adversary. The honest parties then apply their input-selecting machines to their initial input, the session number and their previously received outputs, and obtain the input for this new session. The scheduling of all messages throughout the executions is controlled by the adversary. That is, the execution proceeds as follows. The adversary sends a message of the form (j, x) to an honest party. The honest party then adds x to the view of its j'th execution of Π and replies according to the instructions of Π and this view. Note that the honest parties runs each execution of Π obliviously to the other executions. (Thus, this is stateless composition.) The fact that the network is asynchronous means that the adversary has complete control over the timing and delivery of messages. In particular, the adversary may decide never to deliver certain messages. This is modeled as follows: The parties send messages by placing them in a "out-box" and the adversary delivers (or does not deliver) them at will.
The fact that we are considering m-bounded concurrency means that the scheduling by the adversary must fulfill the following condition: for every execution i, from the time that the i'th execution begins until the time that it ends, messages from at most m different executions can be sent.
Note that this definition of concurrency covers the case that m executions are run simultaneously. However, it also includes a more general case where many more than m executions take place, and they possibly all overlap.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure multi-party protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated by saying that for every realmodel adversary there exists an ideal model adversary that can simulate an execution of the secure real-model protocol.
Definition 1. (security in the malicious model): Let m = m(k) be a polynomial and let f and Π be as above. Protocol Π is said to t-securely compute f under m-bounded concurrent composition if for every real-model non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists an ideal-model non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomialtime adversary S, such that for all input-selecting machines
M = M1, ..., Mn, every z ∈ {0, 1} * , everyx = (x1, .
.., xn), where x1, ..., x2 ∈ {0, 1}
* and every
That is, concurrent executions of Π with A cannot be distinguished from concurrent invocations of f with S in the ideal model.

PROOF OUTLINE
In this section we give a high-level outline of our proof, as well as a description of our new zero-knowledge protocols.
The starting point of our proof is the constant-round secure multi-party computation protocol for semi-honest adversaries of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [7, 36] . Our goal is to compile this protocol into a protocol that is secure against a malicious adversary, in a way that preserves security under an a-priori bounded number of concurrent executions. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [21] presented a general compilation technique for the stand-alone setting, showing the usefulness of zero-knowledge proofs in order achieve such a compilation. Unfortunately, it is not known if the technique of [21] is secure in the concurrent setting.
Inspired by the central role of zero-knowledge proofs in the compilation of [21] , we show a compilation for the concurrent setting in the following two step:
1. Identify a suitable notion of "zero-knowledge" proofs, called special-purpose zero-knowledge, and show that the compilation task reduces down to the construction of such protocols.
2. Implement special-purpose zero-knowledge.
The high-level structure of our proof follows that of Pass and Rosen [32] which in turn builds on the work of Lindell [27] .
Reducing the Problem to Special-Purpose Zero-Knowledge
Idealized Functionalities. Our starting point is the protocol of Canetti et al. [13] . They show that in a setting where all parties have access to a specific idealized functionality, protocols secure against a semi-honest adversary can be compiled into protocols secure against a malicious adversary. 3 The notion of ideal functionalities is a central tool in the framework of universal composability [9] , and can be thought of as the introduction of a trusted third party that is designed to perform a specific task. In the case of Canetti et al. [13] , the protocol requires usage of the ideal one-to many zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality.
The IdealZK
1:M functionality: Informally, the ideal oneto-many zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality (called IdealZK 1:M ) for a language L is specified as follows: The prover sends an instance-witness pair (x, w) to the ideal functionality which, in turn, sends (x, 1) to all the other parties if w is a valid witness for x ∈ L and (x, 0) otherwise. (That is one prover proves a statement to many verifiers). The setting in which the parties have access to (multiple) ideal one-to-many zero-knowledge functionalities is called the ZK 1:M -Hybrid model. Our motivation is to remove the usage of the ideal functionality and implement a protocol that performs the same task but in the real model. In order to achieve this, we show a general transformation that transforms any protocolΠ in the ZK 1:M -Hybrid model into a protocol Π in the real model (without any ideal functionalities or set-up assumptions). This is what we call realizing the ZK-Hybrid 1:M model. Jumping ahead, we mention that this part also includes the construction of the specialpurpose zero-knowledge protocols (as will be described in Section 3.2). We further show that the transformation satisfies the following properties:
Concurrency: The protocol's security is preserved under (bounded) concurrent composition.
Round-Efficiency:
The protocol's round-complexity is preserved (up to a constant factor).
In particular the transformation can be applied to the protocol of [13] (when in turn applied to the protocol of [7] ) in order to obtain a constant-round bounded concurrent secure multi-party computation protocol.
How to Realize any Protocol in the ZK
1:M -Hybrid Model. The above transformation is performed in three steps:
1. Reduce the usage of the IdealZK 1:M functionality to the usage of the more standard two-party ideal zeroknowledge proof of knowledge functionality, IdealZK. Whereas the IdealZK 1:M functionality models interaction between a single prover and many verifiers, the IdealZK functionality models interaction between a single prover and single verifier. The idea underlying the reduction is straight-forward and similar to the idea used by Goldwasser and Lindell [24] to implement a broadcast channel. Roughly, whenever a prover wishes to prove a statement x using the IdealZK 1:M functionality, he instead gives an individual proof of x to each other party using the IdealZK functionality. Whenever a party receives a proof of a statement x it sends an acknowledgment to all other parties. Finally, when a party has received both a proof (from the IdealZK functionality) and an acknowledgment from all other parties it accepts the proof of the instance x. More details in the full version.
2. Reduce the usage of the IdealZK functionality to the usage of a weaker ideal functionality, MemberZK. Whereas the IdealZK functionality models a proof of knowledge, i.e., the prover not only proves the validity of a statement but also that it possesses a witness for it, the MemberZK functionality models simply a proof. Such a reduction was shown in [32] , making use of a general transformation of zero-knowledge proofs into zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge due to [4] . We remark that the same reduction goes through also in the multi-party setting.
3. Show how to transform any protocol using the MemberZK functionality (we call this setting the MemberZKHybrid model) into a protocol in the real model by "plugging in" the special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols. We note that such a transformation was shown in [27] and in [32] for the special case of two-party protocols. Unfortunately, these transformations do not seem to directly extend to the multi-party setting.
The proof of the last step essentially boils down to the construction of a family of n (one for each party) constant-round zero-knowledge protocols, cZK1, ..., cZKn. These protocols are used to instantiate calls to the MemberZK functionality, in the following way: a call to the MemberZK functionality initialized by a party Pi (acting as prover) is instantiated with an execution of the protocol cZKi. In order for the instantiation to preserve security, the family of protocols needs to satisfy the following requirements:
• The protocols are bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge.
• The protocols compose concurrently with respect to arbitrary protocols with an a-priori bounded communication complexity.
• The protocols compose concurrently (an a-priori bounded number of times) with respect to themselves, with the roles of the prover and the verifier reversed. That is, simulation of the protocols can be performed even while simultaneously verifying them.
• Simulation of the protocols does not make use of rewinding.
• The protocols are simulation-sound with respect to each other. That is, the soundness of each one of the protocols is preserved even when the all the other protocols are simulated at the same time with the role of the prover and verifier reversed.
The Special-Purpose ZK Protocols
As in [32] , our special purpose zero-knowledge protocols are based on the bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge protocol of Barak [1] . Before describing our protocols we therefore give a brief description of this protocol with an emphasis on the simulation technique, which will be useful in our setting. (Parts of the following paragraph are taken almost verbatim from [32] ).
Barak's protocol relies on the existence of collision resistant hash functions. Other tools used in the protocol are perfectly binding bit-commitments and a witness-indistinguishable universal argument (WI UARG) [3] . More details on Barak's protocol can be found in [1] . The underlying idea behind Barak's protocol is the usage of an NT IME(T (k)) relation denoted Rsim. This relation is described in Figure 1 .
Barak's NT IME(T (k)) Relation R Sim
Input: A triplet h, c, r .
Witness:
A program Π, a string y ∈ {0, 1} (|r|−k) , and string s.
Relation: R Sim ( h, c, r , Π, s, y ) = 1 if and only if:
2. Π(c, y) = r within T (k) steps.
Figure 1: Barak's NT IME(T (k)) relation Rsim.
Let T : N → N be a "nice" function that satisfies
Barak's protocol is described in Figure 2 .
Barak's Non Black-Box ZK Protocol for N P
Common Input: an instance x of a language L, security parameter 1 k .
Length parameter: (k).
Stage 1:
Stage 2: (Proof Body)
P ↔ V : A WI UARG proving the OR of the following two statements: Before we continue discussing the security of the protocol, let us remark that the assumption of hash functions collision resistant for slightly super-polynomial time can be relaxed to the standard assumption of hash functions collision resistant for polynomial time [3] . Looking ahead, we note that the same relaxation can be done also to our protocols.
As shown in [1], Barak's protocol is computationally sound. Moreover, given access to the verifier's code (or, equivalently, to the verifier's next message function), the protocol can be simulated without making use of rewinding. To simulate a specific session, the simulator commits to the verifier's next-message function (instead of committing to zeros). The verifier's next message function is then a program whose output depends on all the prover messages sent between messages c and r in the relevant session. Now, if the length of all these messages is bounded by (k) − k the simulator will have a valid witness for stage 2 of the protocol. The zero-knowledge property then follows (with some work) from the witness indistinguishable property of stage 2.
Barak [1] has shown that the length of the prover's messages in a single execution can be bounded by 2k
2 . Thus, for m concurrent executions, taking (k) = 2m·k 2 +k would do. We note that the length of the verifier's messages, not counting r's, can also be bounded by 2k
2 . An important extra feature of the protocol is that it is sufficient that the simulator has a "short" description of the prover's messages. The protocol is thus simulatable even if the total length of the prover's messages is greater than (k) − k, as long as the simulator has a description of a program for generating the prover's messages that is shorter than (k) − k.
Our protocols: Suppose there exist a collision resistant hash functions ensemble {H k } h∈{0,1} k as required by Barak's protocol. We are ready to describe our special purpose protocols, cZK1, ..., cZKn (depicted in Figure 3 ).
Protocol i -cZK i
Length parameter: (k).
Stage 0 (Set-up):
Stage 1 (Slot 1):
Stage 2 (Slot 2):
Stage 3: (Proof Body) P ↔ V : A WI UARG proving the OR of the following two statements: The difference of the protocols cZKi from the protocol of Barak is that the prover (simulator) is given two opportunities to guess the verifier's next message (called the challenge). We call each such opportunity a slot. Messages that are exchanged between the message cj and the message rj are said to be contained in slot j. Note that it is sufficient to have a "short" description of the messages contained in one of the two slots to succeed in the simulation of cZKi.
Note that the sequence of protocols satisfies the following two properties:
• the length of the first challenge, r1, is strictly increasing,
• the length of the second challenge, r2, is strictly decreasing.
Thus, for any two protocols cZKi, cZKj it holds that either the length of the first or the second challenge in cZKi is strictly larger than the corresponding challenge in cZKj. This property will be essential to us when proving that the protocols are simulation sound with respect to each other.
Simulating the protocols: Let (k) = m(γ · 4k 2 + length(Π )) + k, where Π denotes the protocol in the MemberZK-Hybrid model (that we wish to realize) and γ is the total number of ideal zero-knowledge calls in one execution of Π . We note that the total length of messages sent by a party, not including the challenges r1, r2, is bounded by m(γ · 2k 2 + length(Π )), as both the length of the prover messages and verifier messages in the protocols cZK1, ..., cZKn are bounded by 2k
2 . It follows that if the simulator can give a description of the various challenges r1, r2 (each being of length at least (k)) that is shorter than k 2 it will always succeed in the simulation of cZK1, ..., cZKn, even if simultaneously verifying these protocols. As in [32] , this is done by letting the simulator use a pseudorandom generator 4 in order to generate verifier messages (and in particular the verifier's challenges r1, r2) when playing the role of the verifier in other protocols.
Note that the simulator has two opportunities to succeed in the simulation, that is by either using slot 1 or 2. As a convention, we let the simulator always use the first slot to commit the verifier's code and acts as the honest prover (that is committing to zeros) in the second slot.
Soundness of the stand-alone protocols: It follows using the same argument as in [1] that the protocols are computationally sound.
Simulation soundness. The last step is to guarantee that the soundness of each one of the protocols cZK1, ..., cZKn is not violated when simulating any (or all) of the other protocol with the roles of the prover and verifier reversed. To do this we show how to transform a cheating prover in this simulation/cheating scenario into a cheating prover for the stand alone case.
Suppose there exists a cheating prover P * that manages to violate the soundness of one instance of protocol cZKi while it is verifying the simulation of multiple concurrent instances of the other protocols cZKj , where j = i.
Using a standard argument, we show how to construct a cheating prover P * * for a single instance of cZKi by forwarding the messages of this "cheating" instance of cZKi to an external honest verifier V (the instance in which P * is actually cheating can be "guessed" by picking one of the instances of cZKi at random). V 's replies are then forwarded by P * * back to P * as if they were generated by the simulator. Since P * is assumed to be cheating in this specific instance of cZKi, and since the verifier messages used by P * * are indistinguishable from the messages used by V , the (stand-alone) soundness of cZKi is presumably violated.
One problem that arises is that the code of the external verifier V is not available to us. This means that the straightforward simulation of the protocols cZKj , where j = i, cannot be completed as it is, since it explicitly requires possession of a "short" description of the corresponding verifier messages. To overcome this problem we resort to an alternative simulation technique.
The alternative simulator. For all protocol cZKj where j = i we resort to the following alternative simulation technique.
We start by noting that except for the "long" challenges r1, r2 sent by the verifier of cZKi we do have a description of all messages sent to the adversary that is shorter than (k)− k. In order to show that we can still perform a simulation, even in the presence of these messages (to which we do not have a short description), we use the fact that it is sufficient to have a short description of the messages sent in one of the slots of cZKi.
We separate between two different schedulings:
Both the first and the second challenge r1, r2 in cZKi are contained in the same slot in cZKj. It follows that there is always a "free" slot in cZKj which can be used to perform the simulation. The W I property of the UARG guarantees that the the presumed cheating prover will still succeed in convincing the honest verifier of protocol cZKi with roughly the same probability.
The messages r1, r2 in cZKi occur in slot 1, 2 respectively in cZKj . By the construction of the protocols it follows that the length of either the first or the second challenge in cZKj is at least (k) bits longer than the corresponding challenge in cZKi. Thus there exist a slot in cZKj such that even if we include the verifier's challenge, from the protocol cZKi, in whole, in the description, we still have (k) − k to describe the other messages, which means that simulation can be performed. As in the previous case, the W I property of the UARG guarantees that the presumed cheating prover will still succeed in convincing the honest verifier of protocol cZKi with roughly the same probability.
Arbitrary Sets of Parties
Until this point we have focused on concurrent composition of secure multi-party computation for a single set of parties, i.e., n parties that concurrently are running many executions of the same protocol, each time playing the same roles in the protocol. A more general setting considers arbitrary sets of parties [28] . In this setting, arbitrary, and possibly intersecting, sets of parties concurrently execute the same n-party protocol. In particular, there is no restriction on what role a specific party plays in the protocol. This means that a party may play the role of P1 in one execution and simultaneously play the role of P2 in a different execution.
It is quite easy to see that unless the parties have identities it is impossible to construct a protocol for secure twoparty (and thus also multi-party) computation in this general setting. This follows since without identities a man-inthe-middle attack can not be prevented. Let us therefore focus on a setting where all parties have unique identities.
First, assume that the participating parties have identities of length O(log k) (note that this is enough to model poly(k) parties). In this case, essentially the same construction as previously described can be used. The only difference is that when instantiating calls to the MemberZK functionality with a special-purpose zero-knowledge protocol, this is done by using the protocol cZK id , where id is the identity of the prover initiating the zero-knowledge proof. Note that, whereas in the case of a single set of parties we instantiated the zero-knowledge calls according to the role of the prover in the the main protocol, the above-described instantiation is independent of the proving party's role and, instead, only depends on its identity. Using this construction the same proof as in the case of a single set of parties goes through.
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A more standard setting considers parties with identities of length k (i.e., 2 k possible identities). In this setting, the above-mentioned construction does not directly work. In fact, in order to make the same proof work, we need to construct a family of 2 k (instead of only O(k)) protocols that are simulation-sound with respect to each other. Below we outline how the special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols given in Figure 3 can be modified in order to achieve this property. Unfortunately, this modification increases the round-complexity.
For simplicity, let the identity id be given in base k. Let idi denote the i'th digit of id in base k. Note that the length of id, denoted |id|, is k/ log k. We show how the specialpurpose protocols can be modified, using 2|id| slots, instead of 2 slots, in order to be simulation-sound for 2 k identities. The protocol for a specific identity id is specified as follows. The first half of the slots will decode the identity id, i.e., the length of the challenge ri in slot i is idi · l(k). The second half will be "mirror-slots" (in the same way that slot 2 was a mirror-slot to slot 1 for the special-purpose protocols in Figure 3 ), i.e, the challenge r |id|+i in slot |id| + i is of length (n + 1)l(k) − ri. It follows, using the same argument as was used for the protocols in Figure 3 , that the above construction yields a family of 2 k zero-knowledge protocols that are simulation-sound with respect to each other.
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